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Abstract—We investigate asynchronous distributed algorithms
with delayed information for seeking generalized Nash
equilibrium over multi-agent networks. The considered game
model has all players’ local decisions coupled with a shared
affine constraint. We assume each player can only access its local
objective function, local constraint, and a local block matrix of
the affine constraint. We first give the algorithm for the case when
each agent is able to fully access all other players’ decisions. With
the help of auxiliary edge variables and edge Laplacian matrix,
each player can carry on its local iteration in an asynchronous
manner, using only local data and possibly delayed neighbour
information. And then we investigate the case when the agents
cannot know all other players’ decisions, which is called a partial
decision case. We introduce a local estimation of the overall
decisions for each agent in the partial decision case, and develop
another asynchronous algorithm by incorporating consensus
dynamics on the local estimations of the overall decisions. Since
both algorithms do not need any centralized clock coordination,
the algorithms fully exploit the local computation resource of each
player, and remove the idle time due to waiting for the “slowest”
agent. Both algorithms are developed by a preconditioned
forward-backward operator splitting method, while convergence
is shown with the help of asynchronous fixed-point iterations
under proper assumptions and fixed step-size choices. Numerical
studies verify both algorithms’ convergence and efficiency.
Index Terms—monotone game, generalized Nash equilibrium,
distributed algorithm, asynchronous computation, multi-agents
systems, operator splitting methods
I. INTRODUCTIONS
In many large-scale noncooperative multi-agent networks,
the agents (players) need to make local decisions to
minimize/maximize their individual cost/utility, for e.g., power
allocation in cognitive radio networks, [1], [2], demand
response and electric-vehicle charging management in smart
grids, [3], [4], [5], [6], rate/power control over optical
networks, [7], [8], and opinion evolution over social networks,
[9], [10]. Each player’s local objective function to be optimized
depends on other players’ decisions, and their feasible decision
sets may also couple through shared/non-shared constraints.
Generalized Nash Equilibrium (GNE) is the reasonable
solution to noncooperative games with coupling constraints,
where no player can decrease/increase its cost/utility by
unilaterally changing its local decision to another feasible one.
Interested readers can refer to [11], [12] for a review on GNE.
Recently, distributed NE/GNE computation methods over
large-scale networks have received increasing attention,
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see [3]-[6] and [13]-[29]. With distributed GNE seeking
methods, each player keeps its local objective function,
local feasible set and local constraints, and the data does
not need to be transferred to a center. Various game
models and information structures have been considered in
those works. [4] proposed a primal-dual approach for GNE
seeking with diminishing step-sizes for pseudo-monotone
games. [5], [6] and [14] proposed fixed-point iteration
approaches for NE/GNE computation of aggregative games
with/without affine coupling constraints, but also adopted
a centralized coordinator. [18] considered GNE seeking for
monotone games based on a Tikhonov regularized primal-dual
algorithm with a centralized multiplier coordinator. [28]
proposed a center-free GNE seeking algorithm for strongly
monotone games with fixed step-sizes. [29] proposed an
ADMM approach for seeking GNE of monotone games
based on preconditioned proximal algorithms. The previously
mentioned works assumed that each player is able to know
all other players’ decisions or other players’ decisions that its
local objective function directly depends on. We call these
as algorithms with full decision information. On the other
hand, [19], [21],[22],[23] and [24] considered gradient-based
methods for NE/GNE seeking, and assumed that each
player can only estimate all other players’ decisions through
local communications. [3], [15], [16] also considered NE
seeking with a partial decision information, and combined
continuous-time consensus dynamics and gradient flow to
ensure that the local estimations will reach consensus on
the NE. [19] considered NE computation for aggregative
games when the players can only get a local estimation
for the aggregative variable. And [27] combined projected
continuous-time dynamics and finite-time consensus dynamics
for GNE seeking of aggregative games by introducing
local estimators for aggregative variables. [17] proposed a
continuous-time dynamics for seeking GNE by incorporating
a leader-follower consensus algorithm when each player only
has an estimation of other players’ decisions. Since these
algorithms do not require that each agent knows all other
players’ decisions, we call them algorithms with partial
decision information.
However, all the above works considered only synchronous
GNE computation algorithms, which need a global clock
or a coordinator to ensure that all players have finished
their current iterations before executing the next one. This
is quite computationally inefficient since all players have to
wait for the “slowest” player to finish before carrying on
their local iterations. Meanwhile, the centralized coordinator
needs to guarantee that for their computations, all players
utilize the most recent information at the same iteration
index. Hence, the synchronicity requirement limits their
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application and efficiency in large-scale networks. In fact,
asynchronous computation has always been an appealing
feature for algorithms over multi-agent networks. For example,
[31] proposed a distributed optimization algorithm with
asynchrony and delays, which was shown to enjoy a
high computational efficiency compared to the synchronous
ones. [2] investigated asynchronous NE computation for
monotone games, and [32] investigated asynchronous NE
computation for stochastic games, both with proximal
best-response algorithms. Moreover, naively running the
synchronous algorithms in an asynchronous manner will
not always enjoy convergence properties. However, the
continuous-time algorithms in [15], [16], [17], [27] require
synchronization of time and continuous communication among
the players, therefore, are not directly implementable with
digital communications and computations. Hence, it is
important to design and analyze discrete-time asynchronous
GNE seeking algorithms with convergence guarantees.
Motivated by the above, the main contribution of this
paper is to propose novel asynchronous distributed GNE
seeking algorithms for noncooperative games with linear
equality coupling constraints, under full decision information
and partial decision information, respectively. The equality
constraint is motivated by various task allocation problems
when a global requirement should be exactly met by all
players’ decisions, like electric-vehicle charging management
[3], [5]. The algorithms are motivated by a preconditioned
forward-backward operator splitting method for finding zeros
of a sum of monotone operators, which was also adopted in
[28]. However, due to the sequential updating order of the
algorithm in [28], it is nontrivial to develop an asynchronous
algorithm based on [28]. Moreover, the algorithm in [28]
requires full decision information. In this paper, we first
achieve asynchronous GNE computation with full decision
information by introducing auxiliary edge variables and
local multipliers and using edge Laplacian matrix, unlike
[28], where nodal variables and Laplacian are used. The
proposed asynchronous distributed algorithm can rely on
delayed information, thus further eliminates the need for
coordinating information consistence in terms of iteration
index. Moreover, the proposed algorithm eliminates idle time,
and each player can carry on its local iteration as soon as
the delayed neighbour information is available. Assumptions
similar to those in [28], [26], [5] and [6] are adopted for
its convergence analysis. Then we propose an asynchronous
algorithm with partial decision information, where each agent
maintains a local estimation of the overall decisions. To
ensure that the agents’ local estimations reach the same
GNE, an additional consensus dynamics is incorporated
into the algorithm. Assumptions similar to [23], [24] and
[25] are adopted for the algorithm with partial decision
information. Both algorithms are shown to be developed by the
preconditioned forward-backward operator splitting method
with properly chosen operators. The convergence analysis is
given based on [33] for asynchronous fixed-point iterations,
under bounded delay assumption and a sufficient fixed step-size
choice. Compared with the preliminary conference paper [30],
we provide the additional algorithm with partial decision
information and the detailed analysis and convergence proofs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II gives the
notations and preliminary background. Section III formulates
the noncooperative game. Section IV presents our first
asynchronous distributed GNE computation algorithm with full
decision information, and Section V presents its development
and convergence analysis. Section VI presents the algorithm
and analysis for the case with partial decision information.
Section VII presents numerical studies for both algorithms,
and Section VIII draws the concluding remarks.
II. NOTATIONS AND PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review the notations and preliminary
notions in monotone and averaged operators from [34].
Notations: In the following, Rm (Rm+ ) denotes the
m−dimesional (nonnegative) Euclidean space. For a column
vector x ∈ Rm (matrix A ∈ Rm×n), xT (AT ) denotes
its transpose. xT y = 〈x, y〉 denotes the inner product of
x, y, and ||x|| =
√
xTx denotes the norm induced by
inner product 〈·, ·〉. ||x||2G denotes 〈x,Gx〉 for a symmetric
positive definite matrix G, and ||x||G =
√〈x,Gx〉 denotes
G−induced norm. Denote 1m = (1, ..., 1)T ∈ Rm and
0m = (0, ..., 0)
T ∈ Rm. diag{A1, ..., AN} represents the
block diagonal matrix with matrices A1, ..., AN on its main
diagonal. Denote col(x1, ...., xN ) as the column vector stacked
with vectors x1, ..., xN . In denotes the identity matrix in
Rn×n. For a matrix A = [aij ], aij or [A]ij stands for the
matrix entry in the ith row and jth column of A. Denote
int(Ω) as the interior of Ω and ri(Ω) as the relative interior of
Ω. Denote ×i=1,...,NΩi or
∏N
i=1 Ωi as the Cartesian product
of the sets Ωi, i = 1, ..., N . For vectors (matrices) a and b,
a⊗ b is their Kronecker product, and a b is their Hadamard
product when their dimensions are the same.
Let A : Rm → 2Rm be a set-value operator. Denote Id
as the identity operator, i.e, Id(x) = x. The domain of A is
domA = {x|Ax 6= ∅} where ∅ stands for the empty set, and
the range of A is ranA = {y|∃x, y ∈ Ax}. The graph of
A is graA = {(x, u)|u ∈ Ax}, then the inverse of A has
its graph as graA−1 = {(u, x)|(x, u) ∈ graA}. The zero
set of A is zerA = {x|0 ∈ Ax}. The sum of A and B is
defined as gra(A+B) = {(x, y + z)|(x, y) ∈ graA, (x, z) ∈
graB}. Define the resolvent of A as RA = (Id + A)−1. The
composition of two operators A and B is defined with its
graph graA ◦B = {(x, u)|∃v ∈ B(x), u ∈ A(v)}.
Operator A is called monotone if ∀(x, u),∀(y, v) ∈ graA,
we have 〈x − y, u − v〉 ≥ 0. Moreover, it is maximally
monotone if graA is not strictly contained in the graph
of any other monotone operator. A skew-symmetric matrix
A = −AT defines a maximally monotone operator Ax
(Example 20.30 of [34]). Suppose A and B are maximally
monotone operators and 0 ∈ int(domA − domB), then
A + B is also maximally monotone. For a closed convex
set Ω, denote NΩ(x) as the normal cone operator of Ω, and
NΩ(x) = {v|〈v, y − x〉 ≤ 0,∀y ∈ Ω} and domNΩ = Ω. NΩ
is maximally monotone. Define the projection of x onto set Ω
as PΩ(x) = arg miny ||x− y||22, then PΩ(x) = RNΩ(x).
For a single-valued operator T : Ω ⊂ Rm → Rm, a point
x ∈ Ω is a fixed point of T if Tx = x, and the set of fixed
points of T is denoted as FixT . T is nonexpansive if it is
1−Lipschitzian, i.e., ||T (x) − T (y)|| ≤ ||x − y||,∀x, y ∈ Ω.
Let α ∈ (0, 1), then T is α−averaged if there exists a
nonexpansive operator T
′
such that T = (1 − α)Id + αT ′ .
Denote the class of α−averaged operators as A(α). If T ∈
A( 12 ), then T is called firmly nonexpansive. An operator T is
β−cocoercive if βT ∈ A( 12 ), which satisfies
〈x− y, Tx− Ty〉 ≥ β||Tx− Ty||2,∀x, y ∈ domT.
If operator A is maximally monotone, then T = RA = (Id +
A)−1 ∈ A( 12 ) and domRA = Rm (Proposition 23.7 of [34]).
III. GAME FORMULATION
Consider a set of players (agents) N = {1, · · · , N}
involved in the following noncooperative game with shared
coupling constraints. Player i ∈ N controls its own decision
(strategy or action) xi ∈ Ωi ⊂ Rni , where Ωi is its
private feasible decision set. Let x = col(x1, · · · , xN ) ∈ Rn
denote the overall decision profile, i.e., the stacked vector
of all agents’ decisions, with
∑N
i=1 ni = n. Let x−i =
col(x1, · · · , xi−1, xi+1, · · · , xN ) denote the decision profile
of all agents except player i, then x = (xi, x−i). Player i
aims to optimize its own objective function within its feasible
set, fi(xi, x−i) : Ω → R where Ω =
∏N
i=1 Ωi ⊂ Rn. Note
that fi(xi, x−i) is coupled with other players’ decisions x−i.
Moreover, all players’ decisions are coupled together through a
globally shared set X ⊂ Rn. Hence, player i has a set-valued
map Xi(x−i) : Rn−ni → 2Rni that specifies its feasible set
defined as
Xi(x−i) := {xi ∈ Ωi|(xi, x−i) ∈ X}. (1)
Given x−i, player i’s best-response strategy is
min
xi
fi(xi, x−i), s.t., xi ∈ Xi(x−i). (2)
A generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) x∗ is defined at the
intersection of all players’ best-response sets, i.e., ∀i ∈ N ,
x∗i ∈ arg min
xi
fi(xi, x
∗
−i), s.t., xi ∈ Xi(x∗−i). (3)
In this work, we consider the following coupling set,
X :=
N∏
i=1
Ωi
⋂
{x ∈ Rn|
N∑
i=1
Aixi =
N∑
i=1
bi}. (4)
where Ai ∈ Rm×ni and bi ∈ Rm as well as Ωi are private
data of player i. Thereby, the shared set X couples all players’
feasible sets, but is not known by any agent. We consider the
following assumption on the game in (2).
Assumption 1: Ωi is a closed convex set with nonempty
interiors, and X in (4) has nonempty relative interiors. Given
any x−i ∈
∏N
j=1,j 6=i Ωi, the set Xi(x−i) in (1) has nonempty
relative interiors. For player i, fi(xi, x−i) is a continuously
differentiable convex function with respect to xi given any fixed
x−i.
The pseudo-gradient of the game (2), denoted as F (x), is
defined as
F (x) = col(∇x1f1(x1, x−1), · · · ,∇xN fN (xN , x−N )). (5)
Then we also impose the following assumption on F (x),
Assumption 2: The pseudo-gradient F (x) of the game (2)
is υ−strongly monotone over Ω:
〈F (x)− F (y), x− y〉 ≥ υ||x− y||22,∀x, y ∈ Ω,
and χ−Lipschitz continuous over Ω:
||F (x)− F (y)||2 ≤ χ||x− y||2,∀x, y ∈ Ω.
With F (x), we can define the variational inequality (VI)
problem as follows,
Find x∗, s.t., 〈F (x∗), x− x∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X. (6)
Under Assumption 1, x∗ is a GNE of the game in (2) if and
only if ∀i ∈ N there exists λ∗i ∈ Rm such that,
0 ∈ ∇xifi(x∗i , x∗−i) +ATi λ∗i +NΩi(x∗i ), ∀i ∈ N ,
0 =
∑N
i=1Aix
∗
i −
∑N
i=1 bi.
(7)
Meanwhile, based on the Lagrangian duality for VI ([1]), x∗
is a solution of VI (6) iff ∃λ∗ ∈ Rm such that
0 ∈ ∇xifi(x∗i , x∗−i) +ATi λ∗ +NΩi(x∗i ), ∀i ∈ N ,
0 =
∑N
i=1(Aix
∗
i − bi).
(8)
By comparing the KKT conditions in (7) and (8), any solution
to VI (6) is a GNE of the game in (2), which is termed
as a variational GNE with all players having the same local
multiplier.
Not every GNE of the game in (2) is a solution to (6). Since
the variational GNE has an economic interpretation of no price
discrimination and enjoys a stability property (refer to [1]
and [28]), we aim to propose novel asynchronous distributed
algorithms for computing a variational GNE.
Remark 1: Assumption 1 ensures that there exists a unique
solution to the VI in (6), hence, guarantees the existence and
uniqueness of the variational GNE of the considered game.
IV. ASYNCHRONOUS DISTRIBUTED GNE COMPUTATION
WITH FULL DECISION INFORMATION
In this section, we propose an asynchronous distributed
algorithm with full decision information, which the players
can use to find a solution of VI in (6) when each player is
able to access other players’ decisions that its local objective
function directly depends on, hence to compute a variational
GNE of game in (2).
We focus on asynchronous distributed algorithms with
delayed information because of following reasons. Firstly,
player i can only manipulate its local fi(xi, x−i), Ai, bi and Ωi
for local computation, since that local data contains its private
information. Secondly, we assume there is no central node that
has bidirectional communications with all players, which is
vulnerable to single point failure. Thirdly, it is preferred that
the players can compute asynchronously such that they can
carry on local iterations without waiting for the slowest agent
to finish. With asynchronous GNE seeking algorithms, there
is no global iteration counter, the idle time is removed, and
the computational resource of each player is fully exploited.
The computation can rely on delayed information, and hence,
each agent does not need to wait for its neighbours in order
to carry on its local iteration.
We first introduce the communication graph and related
auxiliary variables in Section IV-A, then give the asynchronous
distributed algorithm in Section IV-B.
A. Communication graph and auxiliary variables
To facilitate the distributed computation, players are able to
communicate with their neighbours through a connected and
undirected graph G = (N , E). The edge set E ⊂ N × N
contains all the information interactions. (i, j) ∈ E if agent
i and j can share information with each other, and j, i are
called neighbours. A path of graph G is a sequence of distinct
agents in N such that any consecutive agents in the sequence
are neighbours. Agent j is said to be connected to agent i
if there is a path from j to i. G is connected since any two
agents are connected.
Obviously, |N | = N , and we denote |E| = M . The
edges are also labeled with el, l = 1, ...,M . Without loss of
generality, el = (i, j) is arbitrarily ordered as i → j. Define
E ini and Eouti for agent i as follows: el ∈ E ini if agent i is the
targeted point of el; el ∈ Eouti if agent i is the starting point of
el. Then denote Ei = E ini
⋃ Eouti as the set of edges adjoint to
agent i. Define the incidence matrix of G as V ∈ RN×M
with Vil = 1 if el ∈ E ini , and Vil = −1 if el ∈ Eouti ,
otherwise Vil = 0. We have 1TNV = 0
T
M , and V
Tx = 0M
if and only if x ∈ {α1N |α ∈ R} since G is connected.
Denote Nl = {i, j} as the pair of agents connected by edge
el = (i, j). We also define the node neighbour set of each
agent i as Ni = {j|Ei ∩ Ej 6= ∅}.
With the incidence matrix V , we can define the Laplacian of
G as L = V V T and the edge Laplacian of G as Le = V TV . It
is known that Lij = −1 if j ∈ Ni, and Lii = −
∑N
j=1,j 6=i Lij .
Moreover, Le ∈ RM×M is also symmetric, and [Le]ll = 2;
[Le]lp 6= 0 for l 6= p if el and ep are connected to the same
node i, otherwise [Le]lp = 0. Moreover, [Le]lp = 1 if el and
ep share the same direction in term of i, that is either both
point to i or both start from i; and [Le]lp = −1 if el and ep
have opposite directions in term of i, that is one points to i
and the other starts from i. Define an edge neighbour set of
el as N el = {ep|[Le]lp 6= 0}. Notice that el ∈ N el . Moreover,
we know that N el =
⋃
j∈Nl Ej . Refer to Chapter 2 of [35] for
edge Laplacian and its application in consensus problems.
We introduce variables in the distributed algorithm. Firstly,
each player controls its local decision xi and its local
multiplier λi. According to KKT (8), in the steady state all
players should have the same local multipliers, i.e., λi =
λ∗,∀i ∈ N . To facilitate the coordination for the consensus
of local multipliers and to ensure the coupling constraint, we
introduce an auxiliary variable zl ∈ Rm related with edge el of
graph G. Intuitively speaking, zl can be regarded as a resource
“flow” on each edge to reach the balance of the equality
constraint, hence zl can be regarded as a dual variable for
network flow problems as in [36]. Notice that G is undirected
and the edges are arbitrarily ordered, therefore, any agent from
Nl can maintain zl. For clarity, we consider that zl will be
maintained by agent i if el ∈ Eouti , but zl is shared/known
by the two players in Nl. We assume that each player i has
an output buffer where he writes to, which can be read by its
neighbouring players j ∈ Ni, and an input buffer where he
reads from. Since the input buffer also contains zl, el ∈ E ini ,
it can be written by its neighbour j ∈ Ni, j ∈ Nl\i.
In the algorithm of this section, we assume that player i
can read the decision xj from the output buffer of player j
if fi(xi, x−i) explicitly depends on xj , and that it has a local
oracle that returns ∇xifi(xi, x−i), given x−i. Even though in
some applications, such as the Nash Cournot game in [26]
and [28] and the example in Section VII, each player’s local
objective function only depends on part of the overall decision,
we still call the algorithm as one with full decision information
since each player needs to know all the decisions that its local
objective function directly depends on.
B. Asynchronous distributed algorithm with full decision
information
To describe the A
¯
synchronous D
¯
istributed A
¯
lgorithm for
G
¯
N
¯
E
¯
Computation with Delays
¯
(ADAGNES), we assume that
each agent has a (virtual) Poisson variable (clock), which can
model the number of iterations in a given time period. Then
the ADAGNES is given as:
Algorithm 1 (ADAGNES):
Initialization: Player i picks xi,0 ∈ Ωi, zl,0 ∈ Rm, el ∈
Eouti and λi,0 ∈ Rm, and has a local variable Bi,0 = Aixi,0−
bi,0 and a Poisson clock with rata ςi.
Iteration at k: Suppose player ik’s clock ticks at time k, then
player ik is active and updates its local variables as follows:
Reading phase: Get information from its neighbours’
output buffer and its input buffer. Duplicate its input buffer
to its output buffer. Read xj,k−δkj if fik(xik , x−ik) directly
depends on xj . If j ∈ Nik , read λj,k−δkj from the output
buffer of j. If el ∈ Eoutik and j ∈ Nl\ik, then read Bj,k−δkj
and zq,k−pikq , eq ∈ Ej from the output buffer of j.
Computing phase:
i): update λik ,
λ˜ik,k = λik,k−δkik
+ σ(Aikxik,k−δkik
− bik
+
∑
el∈Eik Viklzl,k−pikl )
λik,k+1 = λik,k−δkik
+ η(λ˜ik,k − λik,k−δki )
(9)
ii): update xik ,
x˜ik,k = PΩik
[
xik,k−δkik
− τ(∇ikfik(xik,k−δkik , x−ik,k−δk)
+ATik(2λ˜ik,k − λik,k−δkik ))
]
xik,k+1 = xik,k−δkik
+ η(x˜ik,k − xik,k−δkik )
(10)
iii): If el ∈ Eoutik and jk ∈ Nik , jk ∈ Nl\ik, then update
zl,k:
zl,k+1 = zl,k−pikl − ηγ(λjk,k−δkjk − λik,k−δkik )−2ησγ[(Bjk,k−δjjk −Bik,k−δkik ) +∑q∈N el Lelqzq,k−pikq ]
(11)
Writing phase: Write xik,k+1, λik,k+1, zl,k+1, el ∈ Eoutik
and Bik,k+1 = Aikxik,k+1−bik to its output buffer, and write
zl,k+1, el ∈ Eoutik to the input buffer of player jk ∈ Nl\ik.
All other players keep their variables (output buffers)
unchanged, and only increase k to k + 1.
In the foregoing, σ, γ, τ and η are real positive step-sizes, and
xi,k, λi,k and zl,k are xi, λi and zl, respectively, at iteration
k. δki and pi
k
l are the delays of xi (as well as λi and Bi)
and zl, respectively, to characterize the delayed information
used by the active player i at time k. x−i,k−δk is the vector
composed with the delayed decision xj,k−δkj which directly
influences fi(xi, x−i) of the active player i at time k.
Remark 2: Player i can get the l−th row of Le if el ∈ Eouti
with one step communication before the algorithm starts. With
the duplication step in reading phase, the input buffer of agent
i contains zl, el ∈ E ini , while its output buffer contains xik,k+1,
λik,k+1, zl,k+1, el ∈ Eoutik as well as zl, el ∈ E ini . Each player i
can get zq,k−pikq , eq ∈ N el , el ∈ Eouti by just inquiring zp,k−pikp ,
ep ∈ Ej from its neighbour j = Nl\i. Hence the algorithm is
distributed without any center. The assumption that each player
could read all decisions that influence its fi(xi, x−i) might be
restrictive in some applications, such as in aggregative games.
This will be addressed by introducing local estimations of the
overall decision profile and incorporating an additional local
consensus dynamics in Section VI.
Remark 3: Since agent i updates xi, λi, Bi and zl, el ∈
Eouti simultaneously, those variables share the same delay at
k, i.e., δki = pi
k
l , el ∈ Eouti . However, the variables zl, el ∈
Eouti and zl, el ∈ E ini may have different delays, since they
are maintained by different agents. Thereby, both δki and pi
k
l
are introduced. Moreover, if player ik is active at time k, we
have xik,k−δkik
= xik,k−δkik+1
=, · · · ,= xik,k, while similar
relations also hold for λi and zl, el ∈ Eouti . To explicitly show
how the iterate depends on the delayed information, we will
use the latest index when the coordinate is updated.
Remark 4: The delays arise from various sources. It is
possible that one agent has finished the writing phase (index k
will increase 1) before another agent finishes its computation,
in which case the index of the information used by the agents
in computation phase gets delayed by one. Overall, the delays
account for the time due to reading buffers, computation with
local data and writing buffers. The algorithm is asynchronous
since the agent needn’t wait for its neighbours before carrying
on its local iteration.
Remark 5: Each round of iteration is composed of three
phases: reading information from neighbour players’ buffers,
computation with local data and the delayed information,
writing the updated information to the buffers. The iteration
index k increases only if an agent has finished its writing
phase. We assume that a buffer is “locked” if an agent is
reading from or writing to that buffer. We adopt a Poisson
clock model since usually the total time consumed for reading,
computing and writing phases can be modeled as a random
variable with an exponential distribution.
V. ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we first show how the algorithm without
asynchrony and delays is developed based on an operator
theoretic approach, and then give the convergence analysis for
the asynchronous one with full decision information based on
fixed-point iterations in [33].
A. Algorithm development without asynchrony and delays
Let us consider the S
¯
y
¯
nchronous D
¯
istributed GEN
¯Computation Algorithm without De
¯
lay
¯
s, which is denoted as
SYDNEY. In this case, the update of agent i at time k is given
as:
Algorithm 2 (SYDNEY):
λ˜i,k = λi,k + σ(Aixi,k +
∑
el∈Ei Vilzl,k − bi)
λi,k+1 = λi,k + η(λ˜i,k − λi,k)
x˜i,k = PΩi
[
xi,k − τ(∇ifi(xi,k, x−i,k) +ATi (2λ˜i,k − λi,k))
]
xi,k+1 = xi,k + η(x˜i,k − xi,k)
zl,k+1 = zl,k − ηγ(λj,k − λi,k)− 2ησγ(Bj,k −Bi,k)
−2ησγ∑q∈N el Lelqzq,k
The notations are the same as in ADAGNES.
Here are the compact notations. Denote xk =
col(x1,k, · · · , xN,k) as all players’ decisions, and
x˜k = col(x˜1,k, · · · , x˜N,k). Denote Λk = col(λ1,k, · · · , λN,k),
and Λ˜k are defined similarly. Denote zk = col(zl,k)l∈E , and
we also introduce an intermediate variable z˜k = col(z˜l,k)l∈E .
Denote b = col(b1, · · · , bN ), A = diag{A1, · · · , AN},
V = V ⊗ Im and Le = Le ⊗ Im. Then SYDNEY can be
written in a compact form as,
Λ˜k = Λk + σ(Axk +Vzk − b),
z˜k = zk − γVTΛk − 2σγVT (Axk − b)− 2σγLezk,
x˜k = PΩ
[
xk − τ(F (x) +AT (2Λ˜k − Λk))
]
,
Λk+1 = Λk + η(Λ˜k − Λk), zk+1 = zk + η(z˜k − zk),
xk+1 = xk + η(x˜k − xk).
(12)
Next we show that (12) is derived by a preconditioned
forward-backward splitting algorithm for finding zeros of a
sum of monotone operators. Denote $ = col(Λ, z, x), and
then define operators A and B as follows,
A : $ 7→
 −Ax−VzVTΛ
ATΛ +NΩ(x)
 ,B : $ 7→
 b0
F (x)
 (13)
Theorem 1: Suppose that Assumption 1-2 hold for game (2).
Then, any zero col(Λ∗, z∗, x∗) of A +B in (13) has the x∗
component as a variational GNE of (2), and Λ∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗.
x∗ and λ∗ satisfy KKT condition (8).
Theorem 1 relates the zero of A+B to the variational GNE
of the game. In fact, 0 ∈ (A + B)$∗ can be regarded as a
decomposition of KKT (8) by introducing local multipliers λi
and edge variables zl, el ∈ E . The proof of Theorem 1 utilizes
both the properties kerV T = span{1N} when G is connected
and 1TV = 0. Since related and similar analysis can be found
in Theorem 4.5 of [28] and Theorem 1 of [29], its proof is
omitted here.
We show next that SYDNEY (12) can be further written as
$k+1 = $k + η(T$k −$k). (14)
where $k = col(Λk, zk, xk), and the matrix Φ and operator
T are defined as follows,
Φ =
 σ−1I V AVT γ−1I 0
AT 0 τ−1I
 , (15)
T = (Id− Φ−1A)−1(Id− Φ−1B). (16)
Suppose σ, γ and τ are chosen such that Φ in (15) is positive
definite. Then, note that we have FixT = zer(A +B), and
Theorem 1 applies. In fact, $ = T$ ⇔ Φ$ −B$ ∈ A$ +
Φ$ ⇔ 0 ∈ (A+B)$.
To show that SYDNEY (12) can be written as (14), first
denote $˜k = col(Λ˜k, z˜k, x˜k), and write (14) as $˜k = T$k
and $k+1 = $k + η($˜k −$k). Now, $k+1 = $k + η($˜k −
$k) expands to give the last three equations in (12). Moreover,
using (16), $˜k = T$k is equivalent to
−B$k ∈ A$˜k + Φ($˜k −$k). (17)
Using the definition of A and B in (13) and $˜k =
col(Λ˜k, z˜k, x˜k), we show next that by expanding (17) we can
can obtain the first three equations in (12) as follows.
The update of Λ component in (17) gives
−b = −Ax˜k−Vz˜k+σ−1(Λ˜k−Λk)+A(x˜k−xk)+V(z˜k−zk),
which yields the first line of (12).
The update of z component in (17) reads as
0 = VT Λ˜ +VT (λ˜k − λ¯k) + γ−1(z˜k − zk),
hence,
z˜k = zk − γVT (2Λ˜k − Λk).
However, from the first line of (12) we have 2Λ˜k − Λk =
Λk + 2σ(Axk +Vzk − b). Then,
z˜k = zk − γVT (Λk + 2σ(Axk +Vzk − b)),
which yields the second line of (12) by using Le = V TV .
The update of x component in (17) is
−F (xk) ∈ AT Λ˜k+NΩ(x˜k)+AT (Λ˜k−Λk)+τ−1(x˜k−xk).
Using PΩ(x) = RNΩ(x) = (Id + NΩ)
−1x, we get the third
line of (12). Thus SYDNEY (12) can be written as (14).
Moreover, (14) is an iteration for computing fixed points of
T , and any fixed point of T is also a zero of A +B, which
satisfies Theorem 1. Under Assumption 1, it can be shown
that T is an averaged operator under a proper chosen norm
with the following Lemma 1 and Lemma 2.
Lemma 1: Suppose Assumption 1-2 hold. Operator A in (13)
is maximally monotone. Operator B in (13) is υχ2 -cocoercive;
Proof: A is the sum of a skew-symmetric linear operator
and 0× 0×NΩ(x), which are both maximally monotone by
Example 20.30, Theorem 20.40 and Example 16.12 of [34].
Hence, A is maximally monotone. For operator B, by the
strongly monotonicity and Lipschitz continuity of F (x) we
have 〈B($1) −B($2), $1 −$2〉 = 〈F (x1) − F (x2), x1 −
x2〉 ≥ υ||x1−x2||2 ≥ υχ2 ||F (x1)−F (x2)||2 = υχ2 ||B($1)−
B($2)||2, which implies that B in (13) is υχ2 -cocoercive by
Definition 4.4 and Remark 4.24 in [34]. 2
Lemma 2: Suppose Assumption1-2 hold. Take δ > χ
2
2υ , and
take the step-sizes τ, γ, σ in Algorithm 1 such that Φ − δI
is positive semi-definite. Then under the Φ−induced norm
|| · ||Φ, we have, (i): Φ−1A¯ is maximally monotone, and
T1 = RΦ−1A¯ = (Id + Φ
−1A¯)−1 ∈ A( 12 ). (ii): Φ−1B¯ is
δυ
χ2−cocoercive, and T2 = Id − Φ−1B¯ ∈ A( χ
2
2δυ ). (iii): T
in (16) is an averaged operator, and T ∈ A( 2δυ4δυ−χ2 ).
Proof: The proof of (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 5.6 of
[28], and (iii) follows from Proposition 2.4 of [38]. 2
Hence, the convergence of (14) follows from the
Krasnosel’skii˘-Mann (K-M) algorithm by choosing 0 < η <
4δυ−χ2
2δυ according to Theorem 5.14 of [34].
Remark 6: The auxiliary edge variables are also used
in [29] for GNE seeking of monotone games based on
preconditioned proximal algorithms. Moreover, [29] adopts
a preconditioning matrix similar to Φ in (15) to give
a two-time-scale or double-layer algorithm. However, the
algorithm in [29] is synchronous and involves solving
subproblems at each iteration due to the relaxed monotonicity
assumption. On the other hand, Algorithm 2 is motivated
by preconditioned forward-backward splitting algorithms.
Similar ideas have been used in [28] to give a synchronous
GNE seeking algorithm under the same strong monotonicity
assumption. However, the algorithm in [28] works in a
Gauss-Seidel updating order, hence is not implementable in
an asynchronous manner. The key observation of this work is
that the combination of edge variables and edge Laplacian
with operator splitting methods gives a distributed GNE
seeking algorithm that can work asynchronously with delayed
information.
B. Convergence analysis for the asynchronous ADAGNES with
full decision information
In the previous subsection, we have shown that the
SYDNEY, the synchronous version of ADAGNES, can be
written compactly as a fixed-point iteration (14). In this
subsection, we will give the convergence analysis of the
asynchronous ADAGNES, Algorithm 1 by treating it as
a randomized block-coordinate fixed-point iteration with
delayed information, and using results in [33].
Denote $i = col(xi, λi, {zl}el∈Eouti ) as the coordinates that
should be updated by player i. Define a group of vectors
Ξ1, · · · ,ΞN ∈ Rn+Nm+Mm, such that for j = 1, · · · , n +
Nm + Mm, [Ξi]j = 1 if the j−th coordinate of $ is also
a coordinate of $i, and [Ξi]j = 0, otherwise. Denote ξ as
a random variable that takes values in {Ξ1, · · · ,ΞN}, and
P(ξ = Ξi) = ςi/
∑N
j=1 ςj , where ςi, i = 1, · · · , N are the rates
of the Poisson clock in Algorithm 1. Then let ξk, k = 1, ...
to be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables that are all equal
to ξ. A randomized block-coordinate fixed-point iteration for
(14), or equivalently for SYDNEY, is
$k+1 = $k + ηξk  (T$k −$k). (18)
In (18), only one agent i is activated at each iteration, with
probability ςi/
∑N
j=1 ςj , which updates using SYDNEY. The
convergence of (18) with nonexpansive T is fully investigated
in [37]. However, (18) does not account for any delays.
Rather it assumes that the operator T is applied to $k,
which is the whole vector of all agents’ iterates at the current
time. This means that the communication and computation at
each iteration should be performed “almost instantly”, or that
players should wait until the current iteration finishes before
the next activation, such that each iteration is computed with
the most recent information.
To remove this impractical assumption and to reduce the
idle time of the players, we allow for delayed information
when evaluating T in (18), which yields
$k+1 = $k + ηξk  (T$ˆk −$k), (19)
where $ˆk is the delayed information at time k. Next, we
show the convergence of ADAGNES by showing that it can be
written as (19) for appropriately defined $ˆk, and by resorting
to the theoretical result in [33], on asynchronous coordinate
updates of K-M iteration for nonexpansive operators.
Assumption 3: The maximal delay at each step is bounded
by Ψ, i.e., supk maxi∈N ,l∈E{max{δki , pikl }} ≤ Ψ.
Theorem 2: Suppose Assumption 1, 2 and 3 hold. Take
δ > χ
2
2υ , and take the step-sizes τ, γ, σ in Algorithm 1
such that Φ − δI is positive semi-definite. Denote pmin =
mini∈N { ςi∑N
j=1 ςj
}, and choose 0 < η ≤ cNpmin2Ψ√pmin+1
4δυ−χ2
2δυ
for any c ∈ (0, 1). Then with Algorithm 1, the players’
decisions xk converge to the variational GEN x∗ of game
in (2), and the players’ local multipliers λi,k, i ∈ N reach
consensus and converge to the same λ∗ with probability 1.
Proof: Step 1: We first show that ADAGNES, Algorithm
1 can be written as the iteration (19) with properly defined
delayed information $ˆk. Suppose that player ik is activated
at time k, then $ˆk could be constructed as follows. For
player ik and player j ∈ Nik , the corresponding xik , xj
and λik , λj components of $ˆk are xik,k−δkik
, xj,k−δkj and
λik,k−δkik
, λj,k−δkj . For a player j, whose decision directly
influences fik(xik , x−ik), the corresponding xj component of
$ˆk is xj,k−δkj , while for any other player q, the corresponding
xq and λq components of $ˆk can be any element in
{xq,k−δkq , · · ·xq,k} and {λj,k−δkq , · · · , λq,k} with a bounded
δkq ≤ Ψ. (In fact, those elements will not directly influence
the update of player ik). For edge el ∈
⋃
p∈Eik N
e
p , the
corresponding zl components of $ˆk are zl,k−pikl , while the
zq components of $ˆk corresponding to the other edge q
could be any element in {zq,k−pikq , · · · zq,k} with a bounded
pikq ≤ Ψ. With the above definition of $ˆk, one can expand
(19) as in Section V-A and obtain the updates of ik exactly
in equations (9)-(11). In fact, by comparing the synchronous
ones in Algorithm 2 with (9)-(11), we only need to replace
the $k in (18) with $ˆk and utilize the fact that xik,k−δkik
=
xik,k−δkik+1
=, · · · ,= xik,k and the similar relations for
λik and zl, el ∈ Eoutik . With the random variable ξk, the
components of $k except $ik are kept the same as the
previous time. Hence, Algorithm 1 can be written as (19).
Step 2: By Lemma 2 and the definition of averaged
operators, we can find a nonexpansive operator R such that
T = (1− 2δυ4δυ−χ2 )Id + 2δυ4δυ−χ2R. Obviously, FixT = FixR.
Therefore, the compact form of Algorithm 1, i.e. (19), can be
written as
$k+1 = $k + ηξk  [$ˆk −$k + 2δυ
4δυ − χ2 (R$ˆk − $ˆk)].
With xik,k−δkik
= xik,k−δkik+1
=, · · · ,= xik,k and the similar
relations for λik and zl, el ∈ Eoutik , we have ξk($ˆk−$k) =
0, i.e., ξk  $ˆk = ξk  $k. Hence, Algorithm 1 can be
equivalently written as:
$k+1 = $k +
2ηδυ
4δυ − χ2 ξk  (R$ˆk −$k). (20)
According to the Poisson clock assumption, the probability
that player i is actived at time k is P(ξk = Ξi) = ςi∑N
j=1 ςj
.
Moreover, ξk, k = 1, · · · are i.i.d random variables. Applying
Lemma 13 and Theorem 14 of [33], it follows that $k
generated by (20) is bounded and, if the step-size η is
chosen such that 2ηδυ4δυ−χ2 ∈ (0, cNpminΨ√pmin+1 ] for c ∈ (0, 1),
$k converges to a random variable that takes value in the
fixed points of R. Recall that FixR = FixT and since
FixT = zer(A + B), it follows that $k generated by
Algorithm 1 converges to a random variable that takes values
in zer(A+B) almost surely. Since the considered game has
a unique variational GNE and, by Theorem 1, any zero $∗ of
zer(A+B) has its x∗ as a variational GNE and Λ∗ = 1N⊗λ∗,
the conclusion follows. 2
VI. ASYNCHRONOUS ALGORITHM WITH PARTIAL
DECISION INFORMATION
The asynchronous Algorithm 1 is distributed in the sense
that each player only needs to know its local data fi, Ai, bi,Ωi
and to communicate with neighbors. However, it requires each
player i to be able to access all other players’ decisions that its
fi directly depends on. This is restrictive in applications. For
example, if fi(xi, x−i) depends on all other players’ decisions,
like the aggregative games in [19], [5], [27], Algorithm 1
requires player i to be able to know all players’ (delayed)
decisions. Therefore, Algorithm 1 is called an algorithm with
full decision information. Motivated by [21], [23], [25], [19],
[27], [3], we show that when the objective functions fi satisfy
additional assumptions, the proposed framework can lead to
an asynchronous GNE computation algorithm even when each
player is not able to fully know all other players’ decisions
that its fi directly depends on.
A. Asynchronous GNE seeking algorithm with partial decision
information
The key idea is to introduce a local estimation of the overall
decision profile for each player, motivated by [15], [16], [21],
[22], [17] etc.. We assume that each player i has a local
estimation of the GNE x∗ as
x(i) = [x
(i)
1 , · · · , x(i)i−1, xi, x(i)i+1, · · · , x(i)N ] ∈ Rn.
Here xi is just the local decision of player i, and x
(i)
−i =
[x
(i)
1 , · · · , x(i)i−1, x(i)i+1, · · · , x(i)N ] is its estimation of all other
player’s decision. More specific, x(i)j , j 6= i is player i’s
estimation of the decision of player j. We assume that each
player i is able to inquire only the local estimations x(j) of its
neighbors j ∈ Ni through the communication graph G defined
in subsection IV-A. In this case, each player i is not able to
evaluate ∇ifi with the (delayed) true decision (xi, x−i) but
only with its local estimation (xi, x
(i)
−i). Hence, x
(i)
−i should
also be updated accordingly to track the true x−i. All other
local variables and graph notations, like local multiplier λi,
edge variable zl, incidence matrix V , Laplacian L and edge
Laplacian Le, are defined the same as subsection IV-A. Then
the proposed asynchronous algorithm with partial decision
information is given as follows.
Algorithm 3 (ADAGNES-PDI):
Initialization: Player i picks xi,0 ∈ Ωi, a local estimation
of other players’ decision x(i)−i,0, zl,0 ∈ Rm, el ∈ Eouti and
λi,0 ∈ Rm, and has a local variable Bi,0 = Aixi,0 − bi,0 and
a Poisson clock with rata ςi.
Iteration at k: Suppose player ik’s clock ticks at time k, then
player ik is active and updates its local variables as follows:
Reading phase: Get information from its neighbours’
output buffer and its input buffer. Duplicate its input buffer
to its output buffer. If j ∈ Nik , read x(j)k−δkj and λj,k−δkj from
the output buffer of j. If el ∈ Eoutik and j ∈ Nl\ik, then read
Bj,k−δkj and zq,k−pikq , eq ∈ Ej from the output buffer of j.
Computing phase:
i): update λik ,
λ˜ik,k = λik,k−δkik
+ σ(Aikxik,k−δkik
− bik
+
∑
el∈Eik
Viklzl,k−pikl ) (21)
λik,k+1 = λik,k−δkik
+ η(λ˜ik,k − λik,k−δki ) (22)
ii): update xik and x
(ik)
−ik ,
x˜ik,k = PΩik
[
xik,k−δkik
− τ(ATik(2λ˜ik,k − λik,k−δkik )
+∇ikfik(xik,k−δkik , x
(ik)
−ik,k−δkik
)
+
∑
j∈Nik
(xik,k−δkik
− x(j)
i,k−δkj
)
)]
(23)
xik,k+1 = xik,k−δkik
+ η(x˜ik,k − xik,k−δkik ) (24)
x
(ik)
−ik,k+1 = x
(ik)
−ik,k−δkik
−ητ
∑
j∈Nik
(x
(ik)
−ik,k−δkik
− x(j)−ik,k−δkj ) (25)
iii): If el ∈ Eoutik and jk ∈ Nik , jk ∈ Nl\ik, then update
zl,k:
zl,k+1 = zl,k−pikl − ηγ(λjk,k−δkjk − λik,k−δkik )
−2ησγ[(Bjk,k−δjjk −Bik,k−δkik ) + ∑
q∈N el
Lelqzq,k−pikq
]
(26)
Writing phase: Write xik,k+1, x
(ik)
−ik,k+1, λik,k+1,
zl,k+1, el ∈ Eoutik and Bik,k+1 = Aikxik,k+1−bik to its output
buffer, and write zl,k+1, el ∈ Eoutik to the input buffer of player
jk ∈ Nl\ik.
All other players keep their variables (output
buffers) unchanged, and only increase k to k + 1.
In (25), x(j)−ik,k−δkj
is player j’s estimation of all player’s
decision except ik, including its own decision xj . All other
notations are similar as the ones in Algorithm 1.
Remark 7: The update for λi and zl is the same for
Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3. So let us just state the
differences between Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 3.
• Algorithm 1 requires ik to read all players’ decisions
that its fik directly depends on, i.e., x−ik , meanwhile
Algorithm 3 only requires player ik to inquire its
neighbors’ estimation x(j), j ∈ Nik .
• Let compare the update rule for local decision xik , i.e.,
(10) and (23)-(24). (23) uses its local estimation x(ik)−ik
and local decision xik to calculate the gradient ∇ikfik
while (10) has to use the true (delayed) decisions of all
other players x−ik . But (23) has an additional consensus
term
∑
j∈Nik (xik−x
(j)
i ) that will drive its local decision
towards its neighbors’ estimation.
• Algorithm 3 has an additional equation (25) based on
consensus dynamics to update ik’s estimation of other
players’ decision x(ik)−ik .
Later on we will show that with the help of local consensus
terms in (23) and (25), all players’ estimation x(i) will reach
consensus and converge to the true GNE x∗ of game (2).
Algorithm 3 is fully distributed since each player only needs
local data and local communication to perform the updates.
B. Algorithm development
Similar as the analysis for Algorithm 1 in subsection V-A,
we can show that the asynchronous Algorithm 3 can be
treated as a randomized block-coordinate fixed point iteration
with delayed information, while the fixed point iteration is
a preconditioned forward-backward method with properly
chosen operators. Let us make this clear step by step.
Firstly, the synchronous version of Algorithm 3 without any
delays for agent i at time k is given as:
λ˜i,k = λi,k + σ(Aixi,k +
∑
el∈Ei Vilzl,k − bi)
λi,k+1 = λi,k + η(λ˜i,k − λi,k)
x˜i,k = PΩi
[
xi,k − τ(∇ifi(xi,k, x(i)−i,k)
+ATi (2λ˜i,k − λi,k) +
∑
j∈Ni(xi,k − x
(j)
i,k))
]
xi,k+1 = xi,k + η(x˜i,k − xi,k)
x
(i)
−i,k+1 = x
(i)
−i,k − ητ
∑
j∈Ni(x
(i)
−i,k − x(j)−i,k))
zl,k+1 = zl,k − ηγ(λj,k − λi,k)− 2ησγ(Bj,k −Bi,k)
−2ησγ∑q∈N el Lelqzq,k
(27)
To write all the players’ update equations like (27) in a
compact form, we need some compact notations. The compact
notations xk, x˜k, Λk, Λ˜k, b, zk, z˜k, A, V are defined the same
as in subsection V-A. Denote xk = col(x
(1)
k , x
(2)
k , · · · , x(N)k )
as the vector of all players’ estimations on the overall decision
profile, and denote x−,k = col(x
(1)
−1,k, x
(2)
−2,k, · · · , x(N)−N,k).
Similar as z˜k, we also introduce intermediate
variables x˜k = col(x˜
(1)
k , x˜
(2)
k , · · · , x˜(N)k ) and
x˜−,k = col(x˜
(1)
−1,k, x˜
(2)
−2,k, · · · , x˜(N)−N,k). Denote L = L⊗ In.
And then, we define
F(x) = col(∇x1f1(x1, x(1)−1), · · · ,∇xN fN (xN , x(N)−N )). (28)
Clearly, F(x) is different from the pseudo-gradient F (x) in
(5), since F (x) is evaluated at the true decision profile x of
all players while F(x) is evaluated at the estimations of the
overall decision profile for each player. Moreover, F(x) is a
mapping from RnN to Rn. Therefore, we call F(x)extended
pseudo-gradient of game (2).
Motivated by [23], we define two selection matrices Ri, Si
as follows
Ri = [ 0ni×n<i Ini 0ni×n>i ] (29)
Si =
[ In<i 0n<i×ni 0n<i×n>i
0n>i×n<i 0n>i×ni In>i
]
(30)
where n<i =
∑
j<i,j∈N nj and n>i =
∑
j>i,j∈N nj .
Therefore, Rix will select xi from x and Six will select
x−i from x. We stack Ri and Si like A and denote R =
diag{R1, · · · ,RN}, S = diag{S1, · · · ,SN}. Clearly,
xk = Rxk, x−,k = Sxk, x˜k = Rx˜k, x˜−,k = Sx˜k.
Then with the above notations, all the players’ update
equations for the synchronous version of Algorithm 3 can be
written in a compact form as follows.
Λ˜k = Λk + σ(ARxk +Vzk − b), (31)
z˜k = zk − γVTΛk − 2σγVT (ARxk − b)
−2σγLezk, (32)
x˜k = PΩ
[Rxk − τ(F(xk)
+AT (2Λ˜k − Λk) +RLxk)
]
, (33)
x˜−,k = x−,k − τSLxk (34)
and
Λk+1 = Λk + η(Λ˜k − Λk), zk+1 = zk + η(z˜k − zk),
xk+1 = xk + η(x˜k − xk).
(35)
Remark 8: From the compact form (31)-(34), we notice
that Algorithm 3 utilizes three graph-related matric: incidence
matrix V , Laplacian L and edge Laplacian Le. They play
different roles in the algorithm. The Laplacian L helps the
players’ local estimations to reach consensus on the GNE
decision, while V and Le help to ensure the coupling
constraint and the consensus of local multipliers.
Then we can show that the compact from (31)-(34) and (35)
can be derived as the fixed point iteration of
Wk+1 = Wk + η(TWk −Wk). (36)
where W denotes the stacked vector W = col(Λ, z,x). Here,
A¯ : W 7→
 00
RTNΩ¯(Rx)
+
 0 −V −ARVT 0 0
RTAT 0 0
W,
(37)
B¯ : W 7→
 b0
RTF(x) + Lx
 , (38)
Φ¯ =
 σ−1I V ARVT γ−1I 0
RTAT 0 τ−1I
 , (39)
T = (Id− Φ¯−1A¯)−1(Id− Φ¯−1B¯). (40)
Suppose Φ¯ is positive definite with properly chosen
step-sizes. Denote W˜ = col(Λ˜k, z˜k, x˜k), then we only need
to show that W˜k = TWk = (Id−Φ¯−1A¯)−1(Id−Φ¯−1B¯)Wk
is equivalent with (31)-(34). In other words, we need to show
that
− B¯Wk ∈ A¯W˜k + Φ¯(W˜k −Wk). (41)
leads to (31)-(34).
The derivation of (31) for Λ and (32) for z is similar to
subsection V-A. The first component in (41) gives the update
of Λ as
−b = −ARx˜k−Vz˜k+σ−1(Λ˜k−Λk)+V(z˜k−zk)+AR(x˜k−xk),
which yields (31). The z component in (41) reads as
0 = VT Λ˜ +VT (Λ˜k − Λk) + γ−1(z˜k − zk),
hence,
z˜k = zk − γVT (2Λ˜k − Λk).
From (31) we have 2Λ˜k−Λk = Λk + 2σ(ARxk +Vzk−b).
Then,
z˜k = zk − γVT (Λk + 2σ(ARxk +Vzk − b)),
which yields (32) by using Le = V TV .
The third component of (41) reads as
−RTF(xk)− Lxk ∈ RTNΩ(Rx˜)
+RTAT Λ˜k +RTAT (Λ˜k − Λk) + τ−1(x˜k − xk)
(42)
Hence, there exists v ∈ NΩ(Rx˜) = NΩ(x˜) such that the above
equation becomes an equality. It has been shown in [23] that
both R and S are full row rank matrices, and
RTR+ STS = INn (43)
RST = 0n×n, SRT = 0(N−1)n×(N−1)n (44)
RRT = In, SST = I(N−1)n (45)
Multiplying (42) by R and by RRT = In, Rx˜k = x˜,
Rxk = xk, we have
−F(xk)−RLxk = v +AT (2Λ˜k − Λk) + τ−1(x˜k − xk)
(46)
RLxk is just the consensus terms for xk. Since v ∈ NΩ(x˜k),
τv ∈ NΩ(x˜k). Since (Id +NΩ)−1(x) = PΩ(x), we have
x˜k = PΩ
[Rxk − τ(F(xk) +AT (2Λ˜k − Λk) +RLxk)],
which is (33) for updating the decision profile x.
Multiplying (42) by S and by SRT = 0, x−,k = Sxk.
x˜−,k = Sx˜k, we have
−SLxk = τ−1S(x˜k − xk), (47)
which is just (34) for updating the estimations x−,k.
Therefore, the synchronous version of Algorithm 3 can
be regarded as the fixed point iteration (36), which finds
fixed points of T , or equivalently, the zeros of A¯ + B¯ when
Φ¯ is positive definite. Then we have the following result
characterizing zeros of A¯+ B¯.
Theorem 3: Suppose that Assumption 1 holds for game (2),
and assume the VI in (6) has nonempty finite solution. Then,
any zero W∗ = col(Λ∗, z∗,x∗) of A¯+ B¯ has the x∗ = 1N ⊗
x∗, and x∗ is a variational GNE of (2), and Λ∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗,
and x∗ and λ∗ satisfy KKT condition (8) for VI (6).
Proof: Suppose W∗ = col(Λ∗, z∗,x∗) is zero of A¯ + B¯,
then there exists v∗ ∈ NΩ(Rx∗) such that
0 = −Vz∗ −ARx∗ + b (48)
0 = VTΛ∗ (49)
0 = RT [v∗ +ATΛ∗ + F(x∗)] + Lx∗ (50)
Since the communication graph G is connected, VTΛ∗ = 0 of
(49) implies that Λ∗ = 1N ⊗ λ∗. We have 1TN ⊗ InRT = In
and 1TN ⊗ InL = 0, hence, multiplying (50) with 1TN ⊗ In we
have
v∗ +ATΛ∗ + F(x∗) = 0 (51)
which in turn implies that Lx∗ = 0 with (50). Therefore,
x∗ = 1N ⊗ x∗ since G is connected. Therefore, Rx∗ = x∗,
v∗ ∈ NΩ(x∗), and F(x∗) = F(1N ⊗ x∗) = F (x∗). Then
multiplying (48) with 1N ⊗ Im, and multiplying (50) with R
we have
N∑
i=1
Aix
∗
i =
N∑
i=1
bi (52)
0 ∈ NΩi(x∗i ) +ATi λ∗ +∇xifi(x∗i , x∗−i), i ∈ N .(53)
which is exactly the KKT condition (8) for the variational
GEN of game (2). 2
C. Algorithm convergence analysis
With the algorithm development analysis in subsectionVI-B,
we can define another random variable ξk similar as subsection
V-B such that Algorithm 3 can be written as
Wk+1 = Wk + ηξk  (T Wˆk −Wk). (54)
where Wˆk is a vector with delayed information. Therefore,
to show the convergence of Algorithm 3 we only need to
show that the randomized block-coordinate fixed iteration with
delayed information (54) is convergent. To give a sufficient
convergence condition, we impose the following assumption
on the extended pseudo-gradient F(x) of game (2).
Assumption 4: The extended pseudo-gradient F(x) in (28)
has RTF(x) to be χ¯− cocoercive, i.e.,∀x,x′ ∈ RnN
〈x− x′ ,RTF(x)−RTF(x′)〉 ≥ χ¯||F(x)− F(x′)||22, (55)
Remark 9: In fact, Assumption 4 is not equivalent with
Assumption 2. So the class of problems that Algorithm 1
works for might not be exactly the same as the class of
problems that Algorithm 3 works for. Assumption 4 has
been adopted in [23], [24] and [25] for distributed NE/GNE
computation, and it can be checked with the help of Jacobian
condition.
Then similar to Lemma 1, we have
Lemma 3: Suppose Assumption 1 and 4 hold. Denote
d∗ = max{|L|11, · · · , |L|NN} as the maximal degree of
communication graph G. Operator A¯ in (37) is maximally
monotone. Operator B¯ in (38) is βE-cocoercive for βE ∈
(0, 12 min{χ¯, 12d∗ }).
Proof: In fact, A¯ is a sum of A¯1 : W 7→ 0×0×RTNΩ(Rx)
and a matrix operate A¯2. A¯2 is maximally monotone since the
matric is skew-symmetric. Since NΩ is maximally monotone,
and matrix R is full row rank, the composition RT ◦ NΩ ◦
R is also maximally monotone. In fact, we take v =
col(v1, · · · , vn) with vi ∈ NΩi(xi), and v
′
= col(v
′
1, · · · , v
′
n)
with v
′
i ∈ NΩi(x
′
i) then 〈x− x
′
,RT (v − v′)〉 = ∑Ni=1〈xi −
x
′
i, vi − v
′
i〉 ≥ 0. Hence, RT ◦ NΩ ◦ R is monotone,
and next we show that it is maximally monotone. Suppose
(x,RTu) ∈ graRT ◦NΩ◦R. Then u = col(u1, · · · , un) with
ui ∈ NΩi(xi). Suppose we have another vector (x
′
,RTu′)
such that 〈x−x′ ,RT (u−u′)〉 ≥ 0, then we need to show that
(x
′
,RTu′) ∈ graRT ◦NΩ◦R. With 〈x−x′ ,RT (u−u′)〉 ≥ 0
we know that
∑N
i=1〈xi−x
′
i, ui−u
′
i〉 ≥ 0. Since ui ∈ NΩi(xi)
and NΩi is maximally monotone, then u
′
i ∈ NΩi(x
′
i). Since R
is full row rank, u
′ ∈ NΩ(Rx′). Therefore, A¯ is maximally
monotone.
For operator B¯, it can be written as B¯ = B¯1 + B¯2 with
B¯1(W) = b×0×RTF(x) and B¯2(W) = 0×0×Lx. With
Assumption 4, we have 〈W −W′ , B¯1(W) − B¯1(W′)〉 =
〈x¯ − x¯′ ,RTF(x) − RTF(x′)〉 ≥ χ¯||F(x) − F(x′)||22 =
χ¯||RTF(x)−RTF(x′)||22 = χ¯||B¯1(W)− B¯1(W
′
)||22 where
we use the fact that RRT = In.
Since L is semi-positive definite, Lx can be regarded as the
gradient of 12x
TLx. Therefore, we have 〈x−x′ ,Lx−Lx′〉 ≥
1
||L||2 ||Lx − Lx
′ ||22 with Bailon-Haddad theorem. Therefore,
〈W −W′ , B¯2(W) − B¯2(W′)〉 = 〈x − x′ ,Lx − Lx′〉 ≥
1
||L||2 ||Lx − Lx
′ ||22 ≥ 12d∗ ||B¯2(W) − B¯2(W
′
)||22 where we
use the fact that ||L||2 ≤ 2d∗.
Therefore, with ||a||22 + ||b||22 ≥ 12 ||a + b||22, we have
〈W −W′ , B¯(W)− B¯(W′)〉 ≥ χ¯||B¯1(W)− B¯1(W′)||22 +
1
2d∗ ||B¯2(W) − B¯2(W
′
)||22 ≥ 12 min{χ¯, 12d∗ }||B¯(W) −
B¯(W
′
)||22. Therefore, B¯ in (38) is βE-cocoercive for βE ∈
(0, 12 min{χ¯, 12d∗ }). 2
Then similar to Lemma 2, we have,
Lemma 4: Suppose Assumption1, 4 hold. Take δ > 12βE
where βE ∈ (0, 12 min{χ¯, 12d∗ }), and take the step-sizes τ, γ, σ
in Algorithm 3 such that Φ¯−δI is positive semi-definite for Φ¯
in (39). Then under the Φ¯−induced norm || · ||Φ¯, we have, (i):
Φ¯−1A¯ is maximally monotone, and T1 = (Id + Φ¯−1A¯)−1 ∈
A( 12 ). (ii): Φ¯−1B¯ is δβE−cocoercive, and T2 = Id−Φ¯−1B¯ ∈A( 12δβE ). (iii): T in (40) is an averaged operator, and T ∈
A( 2δβE4δβE−1 ).
Proof: The proof of (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 5.6 of
[28], and (iii) follows from Proposition 2.4 of [38]. 2
Then combined with Assumption 3, we obtain a sufficient
condition for the convergence of the asynchronous GNE
computation algorithm with partial decision information, i.e.
Algorithm 3.
Corollary 1: Suppose Assumption 1, 2, 3 and 4 hold. Take
δ > 12βE where βE ∈ (0, 12 min{χ¯, 12d∗ }), and take the
step-sizes τ, γ, σ in Algorithm 3 such that Φ¯− δI is positive
semi-definite for Φ¯ in (39). Denote pmin = mini∈N { ςi∑N
j=1 ςj
},
and choose 0 < η ≤ cNpmin2Ψ√pmin+1
4δβE−1
2δβE
for any c ∈ (0, 1).
Then with Algorithm 3, with probability 1 the players’ local
estimations x(i)k , i ∈ N asymptotically reach consensus, i.e.,
limk→∞ x
(i)
k = x
∗,∀i ∈ N , and the players’ local multipliers
λi,k, i ∈ N reach consensus, i.e., limk→∞ λi,k = λ∗,∀i ∈ N .
Moreover, the limiting point x∗ is a variational GNE of game
in (2), which together with λ∗ satisfy KKT 8.
Proof: The result can be regarded as a corollary of Theorem
2. With the algorithm development analysis in subsection
VI-B, the distributed asynchronous algorithm with partial
decision information, i.e. Algorithm 3, can be written in
a compact form as (54) with a delayed vector Wˆk. With
Assumption 3, the delays is bounded for all the time steps.
With Lemma 4, the operator T is an averaged operator, and
T ∈ A( 2δβE4δβE−1 ). Hence, the almost surely convergence of
(54) to a fixed point of T is guaranteed by Lemma 13 and
Theorem 14 of [33] if the step-size η is chosen accordingly.
Since the fixed point of T is the same as the zero of A¯+ B¯,
then the limiting points of Algorithm 3 enjoy the desirable
properties with Theorem 3. 2
VII. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this part, we consider a task allocation game with 8 tasks
{T1, · · · , T8} and 14 processors (workers) {w1, · · · , w14} as
an illustrative example of the proposed asynchronous GNE
seeking algorithms. Each task Tj is quantified as a load of
Cj > 0 that should be met by the workers. Each worker wi
decides its working output xi = col(x1i , x
2
i , x
3
i , x
4
i ) ∈ R4
within its capacity 0 ≤ xi ≤ Bi, Bi ∈ R4+. If worker
wi allocates a part of its output to task Tj , there is an
arrow wi → Tj on Fig. 1. Specifically, if wi allocates
x1i , x
2
i to Tj , there is a dashed blue arrow on Fig. 1, and
if wi allocates x3i , x
4
i to Tj , there is a solid red arrow on
Fig. 1. Define a matrix A = [A1, · · · , A15] ∈ R8×56 with
Ai = [a
1
i , a
2
i , a
3
i , a
4
i ] ∈ R8×4 quantifying how the output of
worker wi is allocated to each task. Each column aki has only
one element being nonzero, and the jth element of a1i or a
2
i
is nonzero if there is a dashed blue arrow wi → Tj on Fig.
1, and the jth element of a3i or a
4
1 is nonzero if there is a
red solid arrow wi → Tj on Fig. 1. The nonzero elements
in Ai are randomly chosen from [0.5, 1], which could be
regarded as delivery loss factors. It is required that the tasks
should be met by the working output of the players. Denote
C = col(C1, · · · , C8), then the workers have an equality
w1
w2
w3
w4
w5
w6
w7
w8
w9
w10
w11
w12
w13
w14
T1
T2
T3
T4
T5
T6
T7
T8
Fig. 1. Task allocation game: An edge from wi to Tj on this graph implies
that a part of worker wi’s output is allocated to task Tj .
coupling constraint: Ax = C with x = col(x1, · · · , x14). The
objective function of player (worker) wi is
fi(xi,x−i) = ci(xi)−RT (x)Aixi. (56)
Here, ci(xi) is a cost function, which is taken as ci(xi) =∑4
k=1 q
k
i (x
k
i +1) log(x
k
i +1)+(p
T
i xi−di)2+xTi Sixi. R(x) =
col(R1(x), · · · , R8(x)) is a vector function that maps x to the
award price of each task, and Rj(x) = κj − χj [Ax]j .
The parameters of the game are generated as follows. The
following parameters are randomly drawn as Cj ∈ [1, 2],
χj ∈ [0.5, 1], κj ∈ [4, 9], qki ∈ [0.5, 1.5], di ∈ [1, 2].
pi ∈ R4 is a randomly generated stochastic vector, Si ∈
R4×4 is a randomly generated positive definite matrix, and
each element of Bi is drawn from [1, 2]. The parameters
are numerically checked to ensure Assumption 1 and 2,
and to ensure additional Assumption 4 for partial decision
information case with the Jacobian condition in [1], [2], [34].
Then we give some common algorithm settings. The players
communicate over a ring graph Figure 2, and edges are
arbitrarily ordered to define the incidence matrix V and
edge Laplacian Le. We assume that ς1 =, · · · ,= ςN , hence
P(ik = i) = 1N in both algorithms. The maximal delay Ψ
in Assumption 3 is taken to to be a finite number while the
delayed vector $ˆk in (19) or Wˆk in (54) is constructed with
the coordinates randomly chosen from the past Ψ steps. Each
player has a local Ci = 115C, and the step-sizes σ, γ, τ are
randomly chosen from [0.3, 0.5] such that Φ in (15) or Φ¯ in
(39) is positive definite, and η = 0.4. The initial xi,0 or the
initial x(i)i,0 is randomly chosen within [0, Bi], and initial λi,
zl are chosen to be zero. For the partial decision information
case, the initial x(i)−i,0 is chosen to be 0.
A. Simulation of the algorithm with full decision information
In this part, we examine the asynchronous algorithm
with full decision information, i.e., Algorithm 1. The
players exchange their local λi and inquire zl through the
communication graph of Figure 2. The maximal delay Ψ = 20.
Moreover, Algorithm 1 requires each player is able to know the
decisions of the players who also contribute to the same task as
itself. For example, player w2 contributes to both task T2 and
task T3 in Figure 1. Meanwhile, {w1, w2, w4, w11, w12} all
contribute to Task T1, and {w2, w3, w4, w5, w13} all contribute
to Task T2. With the specific structure of the objective function
(56), player w2 is required to be able to know the (delayed)
decision of {w1, w3, w4, w5, w11, w12, w13}.
w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
w6
w7
w8w9w10w11w12
w13
w14
Fig. 2. Communication graph G: Player wi and wj are able to exchange
their local information if there exists an edge between them on this graph.
Fig. 3. The trajectories of player w1’s x1,k and λ1,k generated by ADAGNES
Algorithm 1
We compare the performance of the synchronous algorithm,
i.e., SYDNEY, the randomized block-coordinated algorithm
(RBCA), i.e., (18), and ADAGNES Algorithm 1, by running
them with the same parameters. Fig 3 and 4 show trajectories
generated by ADAGNES, demonstrating its convergence.
However, since it is run on a single laptop, it takes a long
iteration step for ADAGNES to converge. We can compare the
algorithms’ performance by showing how ||xk−x
∗||
||x∗|| is evolving
with the number of all agents’ total iterations. Note that in
SYDNEY, all agents perform iterations at each time step,
hence at each time step, SYDNEY has N times, i.e, 14 times
more computations and communications compared to RBCA
and ADAGNES. Figure 5shows ||xk−x
∗||
||x∗|| vs the number of
all agents’ total iterations for the three algorithms. It shows
that ADAGNES is only a bit of inferior to SYDNEY, and
competitive with RBCA in terms of the number of agents’ total
iterations. However, since ADAGNES removes the players’
idle time and does not need any global coordination, it is
expected that ADAGNES would be superior to SYDNEY and
RBCA when implemented in distributed multi-agent systems.
B. Simulation of the algorithm with partial decision
information
In this part, we validate the asynchronous algorithm
with partial decision information, i.e., Algorithm 3. Each
player can only communicate with its neighbors through the
graph in Figure 2. For example, different from the previous
subsection, player w2 cannot know the (delayed) decision of
{w1, w3, w4, w5, w11, w12, w13}, but can only use its local
estimation of all players’ decision profile x(2) and its neighbor
w1, w3’s estimations x(1), x(3), obtained by communication
Fig. 4. The trajectories of the consensual error of all λi and the violation of
equality constraint generated by ADAGNES Algorithm 1
Fig. 5. Comparison of algorithm efficiency in term of number of total
iterations for SYDNEY, RBCA, and ADAGNES Algorithm 1
over the graph in Figure 2. The maximal delay is Ψ = 30.
The other parameters are set the same as before.
Figure 6 shows the trajectories of player w1’ decision and
the estimations of player w1’s decision by player w6, w8 and
w11. It demonstrates that for each player’s decision, the other
players’ local estimation of it will asymptotically track the true
decision of that player. Figure 7 shows the trajectories of the
consensus error of local multipliers, and the consensus error
of the local decision estimations. They verify that all the local
multipliers will reach consensus and all the local estimations
for the overall decision profile will also reach consensus.
Figure 7 also shows the trajectories of the violation of the
affine constraint by the true decision profile. It verifies that
the affine coupling constraint will be satisfied asymptotically.
To compare the asynchronous algorithms with full decision
information and partial decision information, i.e., Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 3, we run them with the same initial conditions
and algorithm parameters. Figure 8 shows the trajectories of
the difference between the decision profile xk generated from
Algorithm 1 and the decision profile Rxk generated from
Algorithm 3. It verifies that both algorithms have the overall
decision profile converge to same (unique) variational GNE.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed two asynchronous distributed
GNE seeking algorithms for noncooperative games with
affine coupling constraints under full decision information
and partial decision information, respectively. In the full
decision information case, with the help of edge variables
Fig. 6. The trajectories of player w1’s decision x1,k and the trajectories of
player 6, 8, 11’ estimation of player 1’s decision, i.e., x(6)1,k , x
(8)
1,k and x
(11)
1,k ,
generated by ADAGNES-PDI Algorithm 3
Fig. 7. The trajectories of the performance index for consensus error of
local multipliers, the performance index for consensus error of local decision
estimations, and the violation of the affine constraints, all generated by
ADAGNES-PDI Algorithm 3
and edge Laplacian matrix, the agent can perform local
iteration with local data and delayed neighbour information
without any synchronization or global coordination. In the
partial decision information case, the agent can use its
local estimation to perform local gradient evaluation, while
an consensus dynamics with Laplacian matrix ensures that
the local estimations will reach the same GNE. Both
algorithms are shown to be unified under the umbrella of
preconditioned forward-backward methods for finding zeros
of monotone operators. Then, sufficient fixed step-size choices
Fig. 8. Comparison of the Algorithm 1 and 3: xk is generated from Algorithm
1 and xk is generated from Algorithm 3, with the same initial conditions and
algorithm parameters.
are given for algorithm convergence by resorting to the
theory of randomized fixed point iteration of non-expansive
operators with delayed information. Our simulations verify
only the convergence of the proposed algorithms. It would
be interesting to perform the experiments on actual distributed
systems and study the efficiency of the asynchronous algorithm
compared with synchronous ones. We also notice that the
assumptions for the convergence analysis of the algorithm
with full decision information and the algorithm with partial
decision information are different. Hence, how to eliminate
the gap should be a future research direction. Motivated by
[16], it is also promising to investigate the asynchronous
GNE computation with switching or directed communication
graphs.
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